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W ere the N eoplatonists Idealists or Realists?
by John Bussanich
University of New México
SAGP, Pacific APA, M arch 27,1992
It has become increasingly common during the past decadë to encounter idealist interpretations of
the Greek N eoplatonists. This developm ent is more im portant, from a scholarly point of view, than the
confident assertions by Berkeley in the Stris or Hegel in the Encyclopaedia th at the N eoplatonists
w ere already prom ulgating in late antiquity their ow n respective forms of idealism . One concern that
prom pts the present inquiry is, therefore, w hether we too indulge in anachronism w hen we employ
term s like 'idealism ' and 'realism ' (or even 'universais' and 'particulars'1) w hen talking about Greek
philosophers. In general, I think it is legitim ate—in any case, it's inevitable—to attem pt an overall
estim ate of the m etaphysical tenor of Neoplatonism, as long as we resist the tem ptation to crown the
effort w ith a neat taxonomy of their ontologies and epistemologies. Diagnoses by several recent
interpreters that individual N eoplatonists—especially Plotinus and Porphyry—are idealists or
m anifest idealistic (or generally antirealist) tendencies articulate fruitful approaches to m any of the
m ost intransigent exegetical problem s in Neoplatonic studies. I should like first, then, to take an
inventory of the various indications of idealism or antirealism recently detected, noting the
N eoplatonic ways of thinking or positions these rubrics aim to characterize. Then, since it has not been
done system atically, the suitability of applying idealist criteria w ill be m atched against the sort of
realist principles that are commonly attributed to Plato. M ost attention w ill be directed to Plotinus
(205-270 C.E.), w ith brief appearances by Porphyry (232-c. 305). As a counterpoint, P rodus (412-485)
w ill be called occasionally to speak for the later A thenian school of N eoplatonism , w hich is widely
held to m aintain an extrem e form of m etaphysical realian.
To specify the lim its of this investigation it should be noted that besides num erous varieties of
idealism and realism there are two rather distinct uses of realism. On the first realism is opposed to
phenomenalism; this opposition will be the prim ary focus of the discussion. The second concerns the
difference between realism and nominalism about 'universels', which I intend to address on another
occasion.2 The tw o form s of realism often go together, even if it is correct, as Dummett points out, that
nom inalists need not be antirealists; still, it is notew orthy that some idealistic readings of
N eoplatonism detect nom inalism as well, most notably A.C. Lloyd's.3
The m ost general reason for characterizing Neoplatonists as idealists is their uncom prom ising
insistence that reality is transcendental, supersensible, and spiritual, and that the sensible w orld
depends for its existence on the intelligible world.4 On this antim aterialistic principle (first
described as "idealist" by Leibniz) Plato too is an idealist, not to m ention theists of various stripes.5
1 Even if in the end one does not agree with his claims, it is therapeutic to entertain the doubts raised by
Turnbull about assuming that Plato and Aristotle work with a fully articulated distinction between universale and
particulars; cf. his 1985,24-25.
2 Dummett 1978, xxxi.
3 See Dummett 1963, T47. Lloyd's Neoplatonic nominalism (see Uoyd 1955-1956,58ff. and 1990,68-95)
exemplifies the theoretical possibility adumbrated by Frede: "Realism in this original sense, where the genera and
species of objects also are res not nomina, of course, res of a special kind, is a view which, it seems to me, has
recently been hardly considered, though it was the dominant view, in one form or another from late antiquity to
Abelard's time. What is not at issue is whether there are things like Platonic ideas because these can also be
accepted by nominalists, as being ideas in the divine mind" (Frede 1978,367n3). Though space is lacking to argue
the point it seems to me that a divine-ideas theory need not be nominalist.
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Few w ould dispute ascribing idealism in this sense to the Neoplatonists. At any rate it does not
challenge the sw eeping claim m ade by Bernard W illiams, and echoed by Myles Bumyeat, that
idealism is not to be found in the ancient w orld. W illiams has it that Greek philosophers did not
arrive at the view—held by some m odem philosophers—"according to w hich the entire world consists
of the contents of m ind," the position he distinguishes from the perspective dom inant in antiquity, that
the m aterial w orld is formed and governed by the m ind.6 On the basis of this distinction. Neoplatonic
im m aterialism unam biguously exemplifies this fam iliar and readily understandable form of minddependence.
W hen considering the shadow y status of m atter, particularly in Plotinus and Porphyry, some
interpreters subscribe to the stronger thesis that m atter does not exist. Michael W agner stressses
Plotinus' "strongly idealistic denial of m atter" (1986,59), Irw in the "unreality" of m atter, one aspect of
his quasi-em piricist interpretation of Plotinus (1989,188). Lloyd observes that in presenting his theory
of causation Proclus "finds it almost superfluous to mention m atter" and that m atter is "at m ost...a name
for the logical substrate and is reducible to co-causes" (1990,104,119). For Porphyry, on Lloyd's view,
the em bodim ent of the soul is an "illusion," as is "the 'descent' of the forms into nature."7
Correlatively, the insubstantiality of sensible objects suggests two additional theses. In Plotinus, for
exam ple, the unreality of m atter leaves open the possibility that m aterial particulars are nothing but
bundles of properties.8 Considerable evidence supports this view, as w e'll see, but the additional
claim is m ore controversial: namely, that the bundles of qualities com prising sensible particulars
depend for their existence somehow on their being apprehended by our sense-organs. A particularly
striking form ulation of this stronger thesis is offered by Irw in who argues that "perceptible properties
are sim ply appearances, not properties of the external m atter in its own right" (1989,188). A systematic
exam ination of the ontological status of either m atter or sensible particulars for various N eoplatonists
is beyond the scope of this paper. But it will be useful to see how claims about the unreality of the
m aterial w orld have encouraged idealistic readings of Plotinus and other N eoplatonists.
Now if it is relatively uncontroversial to characterize all N eoplatonists—and here, at least, one
m ight sim ply go w ith Platonists—as m etaphysical idealists or im m aterialists, i.e, that the m aterial
w orld is a product of transcendental realities— the ascription to some of them of explicit argum ents for
4 From this perspective, Plotinus is "one of the greatest idealists of all time," since "the world of sense
has m erely a second-rate reality" in comparison with the "unperceived world of concepts" (Pistorius 1952,1).
Similarly, Wagner 1986,57: "Plotinus' Neoplatonism is strongly idealistic. It not only adopts immaterial principles
as its true causes, but it also denies any positive reality to m atter.... the sensible world ow es its existence and
nature solely to the hypostases, renouncing even Plato's receptacle of Becoming." (The status of matter w ill be
discussed below in greater detail.) Moreover, he claim s that for Plotinus "our cosm os is nothing but an effect of
the hypostases' vertical causation" (59). For another illum inating discussion of immaterial causation in Plotinus
and Proclus see Barnes 1983. Barnes believes that "the chief precursors of Berkeleianism are to be found among
the Platonists" (170), but he stops short of invoking idealism .
5 Hamlyn puts it well: "Plato's so-called Idealism is...a theory to the effect that sensible things, the
objects of perception, are to be explained by reference to Ideas or Forms, the ideal entities postulated by Plato "
(Hamlyn 1984,15n4).
6 W illiams 1981,204-05 and Bumyeat 1982, discussed below in som e detail.
7 Lloyd 1990,136; 1967,288,293. Particularly in the earlier study Lloyd develops the notion that Porphyry
departs from Plotinus in "telescoping" the second and third hypostases, that is to say, reducing the soul, and its
"creation" the material w orld, to appearances of the intelligible world. H is interpretation is based in large part on
a rather speculative reading of a brief passage in Porphyry Sententiae xl Lamberz. W hile I admire the flair Lloyd's
'illusionist' interpretation brings to this aspect of Porphyry's thought, I prefer the less exciting, but more likely,
position that Porphyry is quite close to Plotinus, on which see W allis 1972,112-13.
8 Originally presented in Lloyd 1955-56, w ith supporting discussions by Strange 1981,185-89, Sorabji
1983,292-93 and 1988,50-52.
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epistemological idealism is controversial and problem atic. It is im pörtant to note, first, that idealistic
explanations of how and w hat we apprehend (w hether by perception or intellection) m ay pertain to
tw o different sorts of objects, viz. intelligibles and sensibles, or, at least, to two different ways of
apprehending the same objects. All epistemological configurations cannot be canvassed here, b ut we
should recall that as Platonists these philosophers inevitably characterize quite differently these two
m odes of apprehension. (Recall the combinations of K ant's em pirical realism and transcendental
idealism , and Berkeley's em pirical idealism and transcendental realism .) Thus, it w ill be necessary to
consider N eoplatonic attitudes tow ard perception of an external m aterial w orld, b u t also tow ard the
direct intellectual "perception" of the Forms.
The analysis of Plotinus' theory of perception has convinced some that know ledge of—and perhaps
even the existence of—sensible objects is completely dependent on us. Irw in, for example, claims that
from the reality of form and the unreality of m atter Plotinus "infers that the only reality is m inddependent, essentially an object of awareness for some soul" (1989,189). O thers who discern idealistic
tendencies in Plotinus' accounts of our relation to the sensible w orld in dude Strange (1981,143) and
W agner (1982). W agner's description is particularly vivid (he's talking about iv.4.23): "But w h a t the
object thereby is—w h a t it is a physical copy of—depends solely upon the discernm ent" (19); “qua
discerned, the object just ts as I discern it to he and it is nothing beyond w hat I discern it to he" (20).
M oreover, invoking the provocative term inology of 'appearance & reality' he asserts that for Plotinus
"the m ultiplicity which we are tem pted to attribute to perceptibles is apparent only and not real" (31).
Finally, he, like others, claims that sensibles lack essential properties: "Being a perceptible is not a
defining characteristic of a certain set of Plotinian entities b u t an acddental characteristic which
beings possess insofar as we discern them by means of sense organs" (36).9 Irw in's briefer (and less
carefully argued) assessm ent am ounts to a strongly subjectivist interpretation of Plotinus' theory of
perception and the reality of sensibles;10 he leaves the im pression that sensibles have no extra-m ental
reality, w hereas W agner (and cf. Strange 1981,150-51) construe m ind-dependence less radically.
The ontological dependence of thé sensible w orld on toe intelligible, or supersensible, is, as we
have seen, essential to toe contention that N eoplatonists are m etaphysical idealists or
im m aterialists. But this interpretive principle can be construed as overlapping w ith or even as
expressing a type of epistemological idealism, w hen supersensible reality is some sort of m ind, which
w ould seem to be toe case for Neoplatonists. Strange describes Plotinus' version as "causal
idealism /'according to which "all of sensible reality becomes m ind-dependent in a causal way" (1981,
150), a theory that he distinguishes from Berkeley's. Yet he still w ants to argue that "toe m ind
somehow causes toe being of sensibles." Specifically, it is soul that acts as a productive cause, projecting
logoi as im m anent forms into a m aterialized state.11 Soul is toe vehicle by w hich Forms as (formal)
9 I have given only Wagner's conclusions to a series of detailed analyses, while ignoring (for lack of
space) his carefully nuanced arguments. Moreover, as I read the claims quoted here they do not impute to
Plotinus the Berkeleyan claim that esse est percipi. One of the purposes of the author's italics in these passages
is, I think, to assert the ontological priority of the sensible form qua discerned, not to claim the latter's utter lack of
existence. This would seem to be his position as stated elsewhere. Referring to the "non-reality of sensible
objects" in iii.6.12, Wagner clarifies in a note that by "calling them 'non-real', Plotinus does not deny the existence
of sensible objects or their appearances" (1985,273 with 290n7).
10 Irwin bolsters his claim that perceptible properties are mere appearances with a reference to
Berkeley's Siris (1989,188nl0). Here, it seems to me, he rather uncritically follows Sorabji 1983,293, who too closely
assimilates Plotinus' bundle-particulars to those of Gregory of Nyssa (discussed below), and, with the addition of
Gregory's assertion that matter is non-existent but is only a thought, Berkeley is added to the picture. Irwin's
interpretations are noteworthy, despite the dearth of careful argumentation for which he is well-known, because
they appear in what may become one of the standard surveys of Greek philosophy.
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causes become present in their sensible (and psychic) effects. Notice how in Corrigan's form ulation of
this process im m aterial causation develops into a version of epistemological idealism: "As dem iurgic
soul we create the object; as perceptive soul we give it logos or am ply qualify it further....In a real
sense, therefore, it is 'ourselves' who generate not only substrata (to the degree that they áre formed)
b u t also universals, quality and quantity."12 It rem ains to be determ ined w hat is the referent of
'ourselves' in this sort of reading,1* a challenge that surfaces as w ell in the various idealism s
attributed to Plotinus and Porphyry by Lloyd.
N ow Lloyd directly raises the question about w hat soft of idealism we should find in Plotinus
(1990,173,177; cf. also 95,126). Despite being rather undogm atic about his judgm ents in this regard (as
well as confusingly unsystem atic in his discussion of the idealistic tendencies in Plotinus), Lloyd
provides cogent argum ents for the mind-dependence of both sensible and intelligible reality. A key
facet of the form er sort em erges in Lloyd's interpretation of iii.8 On Nature, Contemplation and thé
One. He begins by interpreting (his word) θεωρία as "consciousness." Roughly the first half of this
treatise is fertile territory indeed for Lloyd's purposes, for here nature, soul, and then Intellect "create"
by means of increasingly real and truer degrees of θεωρία. And, strikingly, w hat are created also seem
to be forms of θεωρία. These are Lloyd's central points (1990,182-84):
a. perfection is identical w ith consciousness
b. thinking is identical w ith consciousness
c. "every real thing is a thought"
d. "a true thought is not just an object of thought but the thinking of it"
e. this am ounts to "a thought w ithout a thinking subject...a strange idea" thát is "often attributed
to eighteenth-century idealists"
f. both the universal Intellect and we individual hum an m inds are creative qua the degree of
consciousness or thought excerdsed
g. "w hen N ous creates it can be seen as the spontaneous m ultiplication of reality"
Taken together these features of the Plotinian theory of consciousness, if we m ay call it such, convince
Lloyd that Plotinian idealism is closer to H egel's than to K ant's. (Earlier in the book he rejects
describing Plotinus as a subjective idealist: 134). In Plotinus at least Lloyd sees "consciousness
überhaupt."
11 Strange 1981,146 provides a succinct account: "it is soul which is the proximate productive cause of
sensibles. The Forms are causes of sensibles only at second remove: both because as nous they are the productive
cause of soul, which is proximate cause of sensibles, and because they contribute to the being of sensibles by
providing soul with the logoi by which it produces sensibles." It should be noted, however, that often Plotinus
"shrinks" the catisal chain by emphasizing the direct presence of the intelligibles, or Forms, in sensibles. The two
alternatives are framed in this passage: "Are we then going to maintain that it [τό παν = Intelligible Being] is
present itself, or that it is on its own but powers from it come to all things, and this is why it is said to be
everywhere? For in this way they say that the souls are like rays, so that it is set firm in itself but the soul-rays sent
out come now to one living thing and now to another" (vi.4.3.1-6, tr. Armstrong & unless indicated otherwise). The
direct presence of the intelligible to the sensible is stressed too in passages like vi.5.8.17-22 where Plotimis argues
that there is "nothing between" the Form and matter. See Wagner 1986,65ff. for an incisive discussion of the
complexities in Plotinus' theory of participation.
12 Corrigan 1981,118, author's italics. Cf. also Lloyd 1990,134: "the logoi which are sometimes called the
'seminal' logoi have the task of conveying the proceeding forms to their recipients."
13 Corrigan refers to several passages to support his talk about "creation." iii.3.4.37-40 does speak about
qualifying sensible objects, but not about 'creating them'; in any case, the causal agents under discussion are
λόγοι, ii.6.3 addresses the issue of the dependence of sensible qualities on intelligible qualities, not the former's
'creation by us'. More significantly, the dramatic passage at vi.2.21.11-59 envisions the 'creation' or generation of
Forms, categories, universals, intelligible qualities etc. by the Universal Intellect—but not by 'ourselves'. Thus, it is
crucial to discover what or who is the creative cause. Scare-quotes cannot bear the metaphysical weight that here
is placed upon them.
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Though Lloyd seems unaw are of the fact, his Hegelian version of Plotinus w as tendered long ago, if
rather sketchily and less convincingly. For the great French Plotinus scholar Émile Bréhier H egel's
interpretation of Plotinus as an absolute idealist is on the m ark. Like Lloyd Bréhier argues that the
Forms are thoughts: the Forms are "modes or states of Intelligence and no longer things"; for "nothing
like things exists in true reality. There exist only subjects which contem plate"; "the forms of the real
cannot be considered inert realities existing independently of the spiritual activities which posed
them " (Bréhier 1928,192,196). These comments, however brief, seem rather close to Lloyd's more
com prehensive interpretation, which can be summed u p in his phrase: "the hypostases a re experiences"
(Lloyd 1990,126).
This cursory survey of mostly recent discussions of forms of Neoplatonic idealism is necessarily
partial and incom plete, but the following seem to be the m ost prom inent features. (1) the m aterial
w orld's dependence on and derivation from the supersensible. (2) the unreality or non-existence of
m atter. (3) the dependence of the reality of sensible properties on being perceived. (4) the
insubstantiality of m aterial particulars. (5) the argum ent that infers from the causal dependence of the
sensible w orld on the intelligible that sensibles are m ind-dependent. (6) the notion that Forms and
Being are thoughts, which, in turn, are perfect states of consciousness.
Before testing some of these interpretations, consider the objections to finding idealism in the
ancient w orld registered by Bumyeat. He argues that Greek philosophers entertained no skeptical
doubts about the existence of the material world and hence did not confront the problem of proving its
existence. Idealism does not become a live possibility, he suggests, until, in the wake of Cartesian
doubt, the question w hether there is anything besides m ind becomes the central philosophical
problem .1415M any of the idealistic readings we have considered do depend, it seems to me, on a less
radical form ulation of this view, insofar as they assum e an appearance vs. reality distinction. Lloyd,
for example, argues that for the N eoplatonists reality is being or thought, w hereas the psychic and
m aterial w orlds are m ere appearances; but, he adds, being's "appearances are not illusions" (1990,138).
If pressed hard enough the caveat underm ines the strongly idealistic reading of the N eoplatonists
inasm uch as it em pties "appearance" of the meaning it bears in m odem and contem porary philosophy.
If, in fact, the low er degrees of reality are not illusory appearances for the N eoplatonists, it is
m isleading to think of them as appearances o f tire higher orders of being.is Lloyd waffles a bit,
perhaps, w hen he offers that "Neoplatonism is only half reductionist, since w hile it is a philosophy of
appearance and reality, the appearance cannot be dispensed w ith" (1990, 95-96). I w ant to press his
final point further than he would wish, arguing that Plotinus' idealistic tendencies are considerably
w eaker than he supposes, and that they fail to underm ine his basic realist assum ptions. Now to test
this general hypothesis on the various topics considered in the first p art of the paper.
First, the unreality of m atter—a key part of the argum ent for idealistic tendencies in the
14 Bumyeat 1982,19,33. In what follows I work from his point that "What I have ascribed to antiquity is
an unquestioned, unquestioning assumption of realism: something importantly different from an explicit
philosophical thesis" (33, his italics). For some doubts about Bumyeat's threshhold for acknowledging the
presence of idealism see Sorabji 1983,288.
15 A stimulating comparison of modem idealisms with Platonism is made by Hardie 1936,168-69: "The
relation of the Absolute to its 'appearances' is not that of the One to its 'emanations'. The relation of the One to
what 'proceeds' from it, mind and its objects, is one of dependence; the relation of the Absolute to is appearances
is one of inclusion. The Argument for a Noumenon or 'supra-rational Absolute' rests on contradictions alleged of
certain categories of thinking, and involves rejecting as appearance all that we commonly take for real. But
Neoplatonism does not assert that minds or even bodies are other than they appear to us to be. It does not argue
that to judge that they exist is false." For another statement that the Neoplatonists ultimately avoid the
appearance-reality distinction cf. Dodds 1963,217.
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Neoplatonists. I am not convinced that Plotinus has a consistent theory of m atter; at the same time, it
seems to me a m istake to suggest, as Irw in does, that, because Plotinus, for example, defines m atter as
non-being, privation, real falsity, and pure indeterm inacy,16 he thinks m atter is an "illusion," that
Plotinus "refuses it a place am ong the realities," and that he "denies it a degree of independent
reality" (1989,194-95). Setting aside the current disputes concerning the generation of m atter,17 for the
purposes of the present discussion we need only recall that m atter derives from the activity of the
cosmic Soul (cf. v.1.7.47-48; v.2.1.17-18, ii.3.18.10-13, ii.4.5, ii.5.5). The question is: once "generated"
w hat sort of ontological status does Plotinus assign to sensible m atter? It is well know n that he follows
A ristotle in identifying m atter (i.e., the prim e m atter that underlies the physical elem ents) w ith
Plato's Receptacle (ii.4.1; so too Porphyry: cf. Lloyd 1967,292). In fact, throughout his discussions of the
nature of m atter Plotinus repeatedly refers to the Timaeus or echoes the dialogue's account of the
Receptacle. In his assertion that m atter is οποίος, Plotinus is closely following Tim. 50d-51a. We need
only juxtapose a few passages from the Enneads w ith these essential characterizations of the
Receptacle from the Timaeus: "It m ust be called always the same; for it never departs at all from its
ow n character; since it is always receiving all things, and never in any w ay w hatsoever takes on any
character that is like ariy of the things that enter it" (50b6-c2); "it is free from all those characters
w hich it is to receive from elsewhere" (50d7-el); "that w hich is to receive in itself all kinds m ust be
free from all characters" (50e4-5); "we call it a nature invisible and characterless, all-receiving,
partaking in some very puzzling way of the intelligible and very hard to apprehend" (51a7-b2);
"Space, which is everlasting, not adm itting destruction; providing a situation for all things that come
into being, but itself apprehended w ithout the senses by a sort of bastard reasoning" (52a8-b2, tr.
Comford).
§ i.8.10.2-5: "it [sc. m atter] is called 'w ithout quality' because it has in its ow n right none of the
qualities which it is going to receive and which are going to be in it as their substrate, but not in the
sense that it has no nature at all." (For m atter as αποιος cf. also ii.4.7.11, 8.1-2; vi.1.26.10.)
§ M atter is incorporeal (iii.6.7.4), invisible (iii.6.7.14; 13.40); as in Tim. 50c4-5, im itations—phantom s
in Plotinus' phrasing—appear in it (iii.6.7.25-30); m atter is indestructible (iii.6.8.12, ii.9.3.16) and
unchangeable (iii.6.10.25-29); m atter m ust exist as a base (*εδρα) for sensible appearances (iii.6.14.7-8).
In certain respects Plotinus departs from or embellishes the description of the Receptacle—as when he
com pares it to a m irror in which things appear (iii.6.13.49)—but this cursory com parison of passages
indicates that the Plotinian position is close to the Platonic. It would be a mistake to conclude that
Plotinian m atter does not exist because for him (and for Plato as well) though m atter lacks being, it
exists as an independent explanatory factor in Plotinus' m etaphysics of Becoming. Hence the insistence
that m atter is an α ιτία της γενέσεως (fix.6.14.35), an αιτία άλλοις του φαίνεσθαι (iii.6.15.27).18 M atter
is independent not in the sense that it does not d o iv e from or depend on im m aterial causes, but rather in
that it does exist as a dim sort of reality that has effects on the nature of the m aterial w orld and on
hum an life.19
A particularly striking way in which the independent existence of m atter is asserted is the evil
effects it causes, the prim aiy topic of i.8: "m atter is the cause of the soul's weakness and vice: it is then
itself evil before soul and is prim ary evil. Even if soul had produced m atter, being affected in some
16 Irwin 1989,244nl2 accurately refers to ii.4.14,16.3; ii.5.4.11-12; ii.5.5.25-26.
17 For an illuminating recent discussion see Corrigan 1986.
18 Cf. the excellent discussion by Strange 1981,122-23,136-37 to which I am indebted. Note also Corrigan:
"matter is 'positive' in genesis, for it is comprehended by form; but, as matter, it goes beyond conceptualization
and exhibits a fundamental identity with privation in the sense of absence and even negativity' (1987-1988,105-06).
6

way, and had become evil by communicating w ith it, m atter w ould have been the cause by its presence:
soul would not have come to it unless its presence had given soul the occasion of coming to birth"
(i.8.14.50-54). This explanation makes clear that despite the generation of m atter ]by soul (qua
hypostasis), m atter rem ains an independent factor in the operations of the cosmos. ;In some passages
m atter even becomes alm ost anti-substance (see i.8.6.31-59, iii.6.1735-37). Thus, I ¡dispute Irw in's
contention that, because soul (in some sense) is responsible for the generation of m àtter, and hence evil,
that m atter lacks independent existence.20 If m atter am ounts to anti-substance and it is one of the
prim ary causes of evil, neither prim e m atter nor the proxim ate, elem ental m atter constitutive of
sensible com posites should be reducible to other entities—either soul or sense-data.21
If a strongly idealistic denial of m atter is not to be found in Plotinus, we still m ight agree w ith
Sorabji that such a radical claim is m ade by certain Christian N eoplatonists, the Greek Cappadocian
Fathers G regory and Basil. Sorabji cites three fascinating passages in which Gregory claims that
m aterial bodies consist only of qualities, which are nothing bu t ideas. Interestingly, in his discussion
Sorabji ignores the suggestions m ade by Hilary Armstrong, first, that the non-existence of
m atter—inferred in p art from the claim that m aterial particulars are m erely bundles of qualities—is
explicitly proposed by one of Plotinus' im aginary interlocutors, but rejected by Plotinus; second, that
Basil and G regoty may have come to their view about m atter from reading this very passage in the
Enneads.72
W ith Plotinus too there is considerable evidence that he m aintained a version of bundleparticulars. Lloyd first called attention to this many years ago and he has been followed by many. As
Lloyd points out. Neoplatonic bundle-particulars derive from Timaeus 49-50 and Theaetetus 157b.23 At
vi.3.8.20-21 sensible substance is described by Plotinus as σομφόρησις τις ποιοτήτων καί ΰλης; sim ilarly.
Porphyry defines individuals as ιδιοτήτων άθροισμα (Isagoge vii.21-23; Lloyd 1955-1956,158).
W hatever Plotinus' views are on the ontology of the sensible object,24 w hat is im portant here is to
determ ine, first, w hether the qualities or attributes that comprise sensibles are independent of our
m inds. And second, are these im manent forms, the substantial properties of sensibles, internal or
external to the mind? Now sensible qualities are the result of (or are identical to) the activities of
19 It is not unlikely that Plotinus read that puzzling phrase in the T im a e u s about the Receptacle's
"participation ini the intelligible" as indicating the former's ontological derivation from the latter. The claim that
"matter is a sort of ultim ate form" (v.8.7.22-23) might hint at this. Given the 'mythic7 character of the discourse in
the dialogue, inferring from the etem ality of the Receptacle that it is also a non-derived entity is questionable. I
w ould also endorse Corrigan's suggestion that when Plotinus suggests that matter som ehow participates in the
intelligible he thinks he is follow ing T im . 51a: see Corrigan 1986,177 & n28.
20 Irwin adm its that if matter has an evil "effect on the soul, it seem s to have real causal influence." But
he avoids confronting the textual evidence in what follows: "If, however, the soul's self-assertion is the origin of evil,
and if matter is an illusion, a figm ent of a deceived and self-assertive soul, its role in evil seem s very slight." And
finally: "We m ight infer that the bad aspects of the world result from the recalcitrance of matter, and the good
aspects from the presence of reason. But this conclusion would accord to matter a degree of independent reality
that Plotinus denies it" (Irwin 1989,195).
21 Cf. Dummett 1963,156-57.
22 The passage is ii.4.11.1-14. See Armstrong's note ad loc. in his Loeb edition and also his 1962. He also
points out that the objection—that matter does not exist—is also stated at the beginning of i.8.15, which refers
back to ii.4.11.
23 Lloyd 1955-1956,62ff.; Strange, 1981,185-89; Rist 1967,105-11. Cf. also Lloyd 1990,46 for differences
am ong the N eoplatonist bundle theories.
24 See Strange's valuable discussion of whether Plotinus' sensible particulars are bundles o f particulars
or of universale: 1981,186-87. In general I agree w ith Turnbull's assertion that Plotinus's theory of predication
closely follow s Plato's and that his account of the sensible world closely follow s the T im a e u s : see Turnbull 1985,
43-44. It's a m ystery to me why this important study continues to be neglected by N eoplatonic scholars.
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logoi, which separate off im ages of intelligible forms and im plant them on or in m atter (ii.6.1-2). The
true being of a thing is in its intelligible logos; sensible being is m erely an im itation or shadow of the
intelligible (vi.3.8.27-30).
In his argum ent that for Plotinus sensibles and their properties are m ind-dependent Irw in (1989,
188) d te s the last tw o lines of the following passage:
For there is a lack of confidence about even those objects of sense-perception which seem to inspire
the strongest confidence in their self-evidence, w hether their apparent existence m ay be not in the
underlying realities, b u t in thé w ays the sense-organs are affected, and they need intellect or
discursive reason to make judgm ents about them; for even if it is agreed that they are in the
underlying sense-realities which sense-perception is to grasp, that w hich is know n by senseperception is an im age of the filing, and sense-perception does not apprehend the thing itself: for
that rem ains outside (τό τε γινωσκόμενον Si’ αίσθήσεως του πράγματος εΐδωλόν έστι και ουκ αυτό
το πράγμα ή αΐσθησις λαμβάνει- μένει γάρ εκείνο εξω.). (ν.5.1.12-20).
O ther passages as w ell have been adduced as evidence of Plotinus' antirealist position, notably i.1.7.25
N ote first th at this passage states directly that there is som ething external to the senses and the mind,
raising doubts about the supposed "unreality of sensibles" or the notion that everything m ust be an
object of awareness for some soul, that is to say, that Plotinus unam biguously subscribes to some form of
phenom enalism . O n the contraiy, Plotinus shares the basic attitude of Plato or A ristotle tow ards the
reality of the external w orld: no Cartesian doubts plague his surprisingly detailed accounts of
perception and file sensible w orld.26 However, the existence of m aterial particulars that are
independent of the m ind goes along w ith the derivation of sensibles' quasi-being from their intelligible
originals.
If Plotinus avoids explicit antirealism , is he a perceptual realist? Emilsson (1988,120) has argued
recently that Plotinus' theory of perception is a form of direct realism , according to which senseperception grasps the qualities or accidental properties (i.e., im ages of the forms) of the sensible object;
w hile the essence is apprehended internally by the soul in contact w ith the intelligible forms. But the
derivative, im agistic nature of the im m anent qualities is an objective feature of sensibles, and these are
in fact "grasped in themselves" in the act of perception.27 (Evident here is Plotinus' Platonized version
of the A ristotelian reception of the form w ithout the m atter in de An. iii.4 & 7; cf. Emilsson 1988, 7). In
fact, unlike the passage from v.5.1 cited above, Plotinus elsewhere argues against a representational
theory of perception w hile continuing to m aintain the causal role of the sensible object in perception. In
iv.6.1, for exam ple, he claims that w hen the soul looks at a sensible object "no im pression has been or is
being im printed on i t For there would have been no need for it to look outw ards, if it already had in it
the form of the viable object...M ost im portant of all: if we received im pressions of w hat we see, there
will be no possibility of looking at file actual things we see, b ut we shall look at im ages and shadow s of
25
"And soul's power of perception need not be perception of sense-objects, but rather it must be
receptive of the impressions produced by sensation on the living being; these are already intelligible entities. So
external sensation is the image of this perception of the soul, which is in its essence truer and is a contemplation of
forms alone without being affected" (i.1.7.9-14). For antirealist readings of this passage see Blumenthal 1971,71-72
and Zeller 1903,637-38.
24 Cf. Turnbull 1985,47: "Neither Plotinus nor, for that matter, any early Greek philosopher betrays any
sort of Cartesian problem concerning the status and place of sensed colors, sounds, hards, softs, flavors etc." See
also Emilsson 1988,3% 145-48.
27
The following passage presents a very different picture than that suggested by v.5.1: "the soul must
somehow be connected with sense-objects through things which are very much like them and establish a sort of
communion of knowledge or affection with them....through these [sense-organs], which are in a way naturally
united to or continuous with sense-objects, the soul must somehow in some way come to a unity with the senseobjects themselves" (iv.5.1.7-13).
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the objects of sight, so that the objects themselves will be different from the things we see" (iv.6.1.1932).28 This passage illustrates the rather uncom plicated naturalism to w hich Plotinus sometimes
subscribes w hen he talks about the sensible w orld w ithout any consideration of the intelligible world.
Hence, the subjectivist tone of v.5.1 (& i.1.7) may derive largely from the sharp contrast Plotinus wants
to draw there between sensation and intellection. Despite these challenges to antirealist readings of
Plotinus, it is perhaps going too far to describe him as a consistent direct realist about perception of the
m aterial w orld as does Emilsson, for some passages sound representationalist.29We must now confront
the same nest of problem s in the intelligible world.
It is, of course, on the intelligible level, Plotinus claims, that we can know real being in itself, the
real essence of things.30 The know ledge of the essences of things, afforded by the direct intellectual
intuition of intelligible Forms, grounds Plotinus' theory of perception, on which there is an exact fit
betw een the sense-organs and m aterial particulars, specifically, their accidental properties. Grasping
essences in them selves, however, requires ascent to the intelligible, at w hich point one achieves—very
literally for a Platonist—the 'god's eye view '.31 On this sort of transcendental realism , Plotinus treats
the Forms as celestial paradigm s, the productive source of instantiated properties—both 'substantial'
(i.e., im ages of real, intelligible substance) and accidental.32But the identity between Forms and m inds
on the intelligible level—portrayed in the passage cited above (cf. also v.3.5.17-23, v.3.8,
v.8.4)—seems to lead to the conclusion that reality is indeed m ind-dependent, or rather that reality is
M ind. The aspiration, even the expectation, tirât one can become the Intellect or Universal M ind
(vi.7.15.1-2) (this, Plotinus' position, is considered w ildly optim istic by Proclus and Iamblichus, for
example), lends considerable support to Lloyd's contention that "the hypostases are experiences; they
are types of consciousness; while, therefore, they have abstract and objective properties, they have
also w hat we call phenomenologocial properties" (1990,126). Hence, "all the elem ents in the
N eoplatonic hierarchy are thoughts" (134). First, a term inological point. Though he know s as well as
anyone that νόησις, as non-discursive thought, is distinct from our ordinary notion of knowing, Lloyd
continues to em ploy "thought" to render the Greek term , notw ithstanding its transcendental and
non-propositional character.33 This practice gives a false im pression of the sim ilarity of norm al (or
discursive) and supersensible mental states, recalling also his identification of θεωρία w ith
consciousness. Lloyd, it seems to me, is making a valiant effort to hint at the "intellectual"
28 Cf. Turnbull 1985, 75n83: "No Platonist would dream of putting sensations, the results o f causal
interactions of the physical environment w ith sense-organs, 'in the mind' nor for that matter 'in' the soul."
29 I agree with som e of Modrak's objections to Em ilsson's thesis. W hile adm itting, with Em ilsson, that
Plotinus' theory of perception is "arguably a causal theory" she asserts that it is "an eccentric one since the causal
chain is psychic not physical and the object perceived-is necessary but not sufficient to bring about the
perception"; thus for her "it does not appear to be a form of direct realism." On the other hand, her claim that "the
soul is in direct contact only w ith the sensory affection" is too inexact to explain the passage from iv.6.1 cited
above. And in the follow ing—also relevant to iv.6.1— her definition o f realism is perhaps too "scientific": "If the
quality in the organ w ere identical to the quality in matter, the account w ould be realist, how ever the quality in the
organ is only sim ilar to the quality in matter and thus the claim that the quality in the organ is what is directly
apprehended defeats the claim to realism." (All quotes from Modrak 1989,113). N ote that Modrak does not quote
or discuss any o f Plotinus' specific terms or descriptions.
30 A succinct statement is the often discussed v.5.2: "since one must bring in know ledge and truth and
w atchfully preserve reality and the know ledge of what each thing is—but not only the know ledge of each thing's
qualities, since if w e only had that w e should have an im age and a trace o f realities, and not possess and live with
and be fused w ith the realities themselves" (v.5.2.5-9).
31 Cf. Putnam 1983,209,225.
32 Cf. Armstrong 1978,71,75-76.
33 For his remarks on the differences see 1990,168; see also his 1986,263 where he argues that νους too
should be translated as "thought."
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transparency w ith in Plotinus' intelligible w orld by practicing a kind of lexical transparency, or of
discovering unm itigated identity everyw here ih the intelligible. And, analogously, he recognizes, but
does not sufficiently stress the radical disjunction betw een discursive thought and awareness
/consciousness and their noetic exemplars.341 would also em phasize m ore strongly than Lloyd (cf. 1990,
181) the great difference between the em pirical and the transcendental selves: the form er cannot be
said to be a 'creator of form s' except in the m ost derivative and inferior manner.
W hat does this have to do w ith questions about N eoplatonic idealism ? First, by stressing the
identity of νοΰς,νσησις, and νοητά, Lloyd blurs metaphysical distinctions that Plotinus w ishes to
m aintain. H is conclusions about "thought w ithout a thinking subject" (rem iniscent of 18th century
idealism ) and that "every real thing is a thought" (1990,182-83) open the door—in one swoop—to an
extrem e abstract im personalism , or, paradoxically, a radical subjectivism. D eveloping the first
possibility yields the (to my mind) rather unidealistic formulation: "since consciousness at its best does
not have a thinker who is distinct from it, we cannot ask whose consciousness creates w hat exists" (183).
The "thinking" engaged in by a trans-personal self eludes the sort of analysis we m ight apply to
discursive reasoning or perception. If this sounds Hegelian to Lloyd, it is im portant to recall that
H egel's account of Plotinian N eoplatonism is notorious for focusing heavily on noetic self-identity,
w hile ignoring the hyper-transcendence of the One, a tendency that surfaces now and then in Lloyd's
ow n analysis.35
W hat m otivates this em phasis on noetic identity is, of course, some of Plotinus' own statem ents,
like the following: "We have here, then, one nature. Intellect, all realities and tru th (νους, τα δντα
πάντα, ή άλήθεια)" (v.5.3.1-2); "for Intellect does not apprehend objects which preexist it—as sense
does sense-objects—Intellect itself is its objects... But it is here w ith its objects and the same as and one
w ith them " (v.4.2.44-49). N ote, finally, the following passage, the first p art of w hich is perhaps the
strongest statem ent of the peculiar kind of constructivism that one can find in the Enneads; bu t the
latter p art (after file asterisk) casts a very different light on the whole: "But each of them [sc. the
Forms] is Intellect and Being, and the whole is universal Intellect and Being, Intellect m aking Being
exist in thinking it, and Being giving Intellect thinking and existence by being thought.* But the cause
of thinking is som ething else, which is also cause of being; they both therefore have a cause other than
them selves" (v.1.4.26-31).36 Thus, Lloyd claims that neither Being nor Intellect is prior to the other.
He intends his interpretation to cover the generation of Intellect as well: "there can be no answ er to the
question w hether it is making or discovering" its objects or contents.37 Unlike Lloyd I prefer to see
Plotinus, and the other N eoplatonists too, describing the awakening and the activity of noetic thought
as a process of discovery, followed by an inexpresssible fusing w ith w hat is.
34 See the excellent discussion of the difficulties of rendering νους into English by Rist 1989,190-97. Note
his conclusion: "it seems unacceptable to limit our translation of nous to words associated primarily with thinking
rather than with being: being, that is, in a state of awareness of metaphysical reality, or rather, for Plotinus, of the
living spiritual reality of the universe" (197). In the end, Rist settles on "spiritual self' as the best we can do.
35 See the excellent survey of the evidence by Beierwaltes, especially 353 where he shows how Hegel
"denatures" the Plotinian One and elevates pure thought to the supreme goal of Plotinian philosophizing.
36 'Έκαστον δέ αυτών νους καί δν έστι και το σύμπαν πας νους καί παν δν, ό μέν νους κατά το νοείν
ΰφιστάς τδ δν, τό δέ δν τφ νοείσθαι τφ νφ διδόν τό νοείν καί το είναι. Του δέ νοείν αίτιον άλλο, δ καί τφ
δντι· άμφοτέρων ουν &μα αίτιον άλλο.
37 Lloyd 1990,178. He identifies this explanation as specifying one aspect of Plotinus' idealism. Cp. the
remarks of Dummett 1959,185, which, though directed to the philosophy of mathematics, are analogous to Lloyd's
description: 'It seems that we ought to interpose between the platonist and constructivist picture an intermediate
picture, say of objects springing into being in response to our probing. We do not make the objects but must
accept them as we find them...but they were not already there for our statements to be true or false of before we
carried out the investigations which brought them into being."
30

In light of the passage from v.1.4 (and others) Lloyd's em phasis on noetic self-identity or, again, on
the abolition of the subject-object distinction ignores the overarching causal efficacy of the One or Good
in the generation of Intellect, as well as bracketing the role of the One in the mystical reversion.38 To
oversim plify: Intellect's self-knowledge or self-intellection is only one phase of its life,
notw ithstanding the universality of its noetic ένέργεια. The im portant distinction at vi.7.35.20-22 is
relevant here: "Intellect ...has one pow er for thinking, by which it looks at the things in itself, and one
by which it looks at w hat transcends it by a direct awareness and reception." So even if there is a
certain kind of m ind-dependence in Plotinus' intelligible w orld, viz. its self-reflexivity, this is only
part of the picture. Even w ithin the intelligible sphere the priority of Being to thought is asserted
rather strongly.39 For the full picture we still have to reckon w ith the crucial fact in Plotinus' thought
that the One, qua transcendent object of thought, is ontologically prior to Intellect (see v.4.2.5-13,
v.9.5-7, vi.5.7.1-6).40 Add to this the em phasis throughout the Neoplatonic tradition on the First
Principle's utter inexpressibility and transcendence of all categories and thought (in Plotinus cf.
especially vi.7.37-41), any interpretation suggesting that at the highest level reality is m inddependent or is a form of thought is misleading.41 In the end there is a fundam ental difference between
the reality of the One and the activity of thought.42

38 See m y 1988,159-71.
39 "For its self-directed activity is not substance, but being is that to which the activity is directed and
from which it comes: for that which is looked at is being, not the look; but the look, too, possesses being, because it
com es from and is directed to being" (Ή μεν γάρ ενέργεια ή εις αυτόν ούκ ουσία, εις δ δε και άφ’ ου, τό ον · τό
γάρ βλεπόμενον τό δν, ουχ ή βλέψις* εχει δε και αυτή τό είναι, δτι άφ’ oh και εις ον, δν. vi.2.814-16).
40 On this point and with respect to the question of whether or not the N eoplatonists are idealists, I think
Proclus' position is very similar to Plotinus'. At Elements of Theology §161 Proclus argues that "while the
Intelligence is an existent because of primal Being, this primal Being is itself separate from the Intelligence,
because Intelligence is posterior to Being." Proclus' "primal Being" plays, roughly, the causal role in his system
that the O ne-as-intelligized does in Plotinus'; for the differences between Proclus' primal being and Plotinus'
noetic being, i.e. internal to Intellect, cf. Dodds 1963, 281, 285.
In his exhaustive discussion of Socrates' suggestion to Parmenides that perhaps the Forms are thoughts
(Farm, 132b), Proclus drives home from every possible angle both the transcendence of thought by a higher kind
of being and the causal interdependence of a lower kind of being and thought within Intellect; cf. Proclus in Parm.
891-901. In short, Proclus' view is close to that of Plotinus' at v.1.4.26-31 and vi.2.8.14-16.
41 Lloyd is quite aware of these fundamental claims but, again, invests them w ith little w eight—if I
correctly understand the follow ing elliptical and very compressed statement: "Since Intellect is what is thought as
w ell as the thinking, w e can infer that what is thought and what exists presuppose som ething which is neither
thought nor existence. This is the second fact which has a bearing on Plotinus' idealism . For Existence'—more
com m only translated as 'being'—has here the connotation which is appropriate to idealism , nam ely of being a
distinct object o f thought. But so far from exhausting the realist's notion of 'existence' this has turned out to
require there to be som ething which does not, in Plotinus' and the idealist's terms, exist. At any rate, this
som ething can have no fixed and concrete properties (for otherwise it would be an object of thought) but is there?'
(1990,179).
42 Though his discussion is brief and general, Burnyeat's claim that w e don't really find "idealism"
am ong the N eoplatonists is largely justified on the grounds that (i) the duality betw een subject and object is not
overcom e on the level o f the Intellect; and (ii) even if everything were reducible to the One, still w e w ould not have
a monism of mind. See Burnyeat 1982,18.
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argument (353e; cf. 389a).62 Although this disengagement vitiates the educational function o f the
elenchus, it frees Socrates to take the argument wherever he wishes, winning Thrasymachus’
"agreement", for example, to the proposition that justice is the excellence o f the soul (353e).
At the beginning o f book 2, Plato dissociates the arguments to be refuted from the personal
character and beliefs o f the interlocutors in a different way, by giving Glaucon and Adeimantus the
role o f devil's advocates.63 Unlike Thrasymachus, who claimed to care about the question at
issue (344e), but withdrew from sincere participation in the argument, Plato's brothers are
committed to the argument, but not to the view s under scrutiny .64 By making an eloquent case
for a position they do not believe in, they illustrate the positive value o f intellectual disengagement.
Socrates confesses that his aporia. caused by the brothers' dissatisfaction with his elenctic
arguments, is exacerbated by their own detachment from the view s they have put forward for his
refutation (368ab). Since these are not their own view s, he cannot use the elenchus to pick them
apart and prove them inconsistent with the brothers' other convictions. He cannot refute the
interlocutors themselves, in the elenctic manner, but must show what is wrong with these views
regardless o f who holds them. As Socrates says to Phaedrus in the Phaedrus. "To you perhaps it
makes a difference who the speaker is and where he is from. For you do not consider this alone,
whether what he says is or is not the case." "A justifiable rebuke," says Phaedrus (Phdr. 275bc).
Glaucon and Adeimantus' philosophical talents equip them to serve as effective devil's
advocates, who can not only criticize a point o f view but defend one as persuasively as possible, in
order to give it a fair hearing. In this role they restate Thrasymachus' most serious charges against
Socrates and his method. They do not accuse him o f dishonesty. They understand that his irony
is not, as Thrasymachus thinks (337a), a form o f dissembling (cf. 3 62el). Yet they are no more
convinced than Thrasymachus is by his arguments (358b, 368b). When Glaucon complains that
Thrasymachus was silenced prematurely (358b), he im plies that Socrates might have fared less
successfully with a different interlocutor. Though Plato's brothers never accuse Socrates o f
cheating, their restatement o f Thrasymachus' view s im plies that Socrates’ focus on a particular
interlocutor has allowed him to get away with arguments which might not survive more rigorous
scrutiny. As late as book 6, Adeimantus w ill recall the discom fort experienced by those
respondents who cannot gainsay Socrates’ arguments yet feel they have been led astray by them
(487bc). To prevent such discontent, the case for justice must be made not just in a way that
silences the interlocutor, but in the most convincing manna* possible. This includes refuting not
merely the interlocutor's arguments but the best arguments by the best speakers. Socrates
obliquely acknowledges this when he claims to be defeated by Glaucon's case for injustice (362d),
applauds the brothers' eloquence (368a), and confesses the magnitude o f his task in face o f their
dissatisfaction with his previous arguments (368bc).
Glaucon and Adeimantus also restate Thrasymachus' other main complaint—that Socrates
refuses to give a positive account o f his own views. O f the three interlocutors scrutinized in book
1, only Thrasymachus tries to make Socrates in turn examine his ideas and assumptions about the
subject under discussion. He points out that it is easier to ask questions than to answer them
(336c; cf. 337e), demands a positive definition o f justice (336cd), and sneers at Socrates’
"wisdom" for its lack o f positive teaching (338b). At one point, he declares that he dislikes the
argument and could answer it, but that Socrates would call his argument demagoguery (350d). In
other words, he remains unconvinced not only by the argument but by a method which eschews
substantial speeches. His own positive statements, including a long oration, are presented only to
be picked apart by the elenchus. But whatever his faults, he does at least put forward substantive
62 Cf. Blundell 147 n. 74.
63 Socrates explicitly distinguishes their character (tropos) from their logoi (368b).
64 Throughout his speech Glaucon makes it clear that he does not agree with the views he is expressing (e.g. 358c,
359b, 360c5,360c8,360d2,360d4,361e). Adeimantus does likewise (367a).
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ideas about justice. Socrates' brand o f argument in book 1 is essentially critical and negative, and
as such is not a successful source o f positive moral conviction. Even Polemarchus learns only to
criticize (cf, 335e).
Like Thrasymachus, Glaucon and Adeimantus demand a substantial exposition o f Socrates'
own view s on justice. A convincing defence o f justice requires some positive substitute for
Thrasymachus' position, some substantive advice on "how to live the most profitable life" (344e,
cf. 352d). The brothers make die case for injustice as vehementiy as possible in order to elicit this
kind o f response (358bcd, 367ab). Glaucon wants to hear such an account from Socrates in
particular (358d), and Adeimantus regards him as having a special responsibility to provide one,
because he (Socrates) has devoted his life to this question (367d, 506b). Adeimantus even links
Socrates with other self-styled "praisers o f justice", all o f whom have failed to provide young men
like him self with a satisfactory account o f justice and its consequences (366d-67a). The brothers
are thus challenging not only the arguments o f book 1, but the efficacy o f Socrates' method
generally as a means o f discovering and teaching moral truth. The elenctic Socrates is accustomed
to scrutinizing the lives o f others, but now his own way o f life is on trial. This time the jury is
composed not o f hostile or indifferent fellow -citizens, but o f men who share his philosophical
concerns, including several talented and impressionable youths whose own lives may hang in the
balance.
Book 1 concludes with Socrates declaring that they must find out what justice is before
investigating what it is like (354b). The question and the methodological stricture are both typical
o f the elenctic dialogues. But after Glaucon and Adeimantus have issued their challenge at the
beginning o f book 2, the question is pursued quite differently, and the methodological stricture
abandoned.^ Plato makes Socrates voice positive and sustained ideas concerning the nature o f
justice, thus tacitly granting some legitimacy not only to Glaucon and Adeimantus' dissatisfaction,
but to Thrasymachus' complaints about the negativity o f the elenchus. Once Socrates turns to a
new method, and starts to develop his own substantial theories, Thrasymachus is converted into an
attentive, interested and even friendly listener (450a; cf. 498cd).°6 Positive and successful
dialectic requires cooperative interlocutors, but conversely, an intransigent interlocutor is more
likely to cooperate when his own legitimate concerns are addressed. In book 1 Socrates adapted
his manner, but not his method, to each respondent. N ow he has conformed much more
drastically and successfully to Thrasymachus' needs.
In their challenge to Socrates, then, Glaucon and Adeimantus not only question the
adequacy o f his arguments, but cast doubt on certain aspects o f his method. Just as their speeches
purport to restate Thrasymachus' philosophical position, their dissatisfaction with book 1 endorses
some o f his complaints against the Socratic method, in particular its negativity and its exploitation
o f the interlocutor's philosophical weaknesses. Their admirable phusis and firm convictions
enhance the significance o f this dissatisfaction. That such philosophically talented interlocutors
take Thrasymachus' ideas seriously shows the extent o f the threat he poses. That they find
Socrates' refutation inadequate poses serious questions about the efficacy o f his method. That they
adopt Thrasymachus' own method—the long rhetorical discourse—suggests that Socrates' rejection
o f such methods was at best premature. The gadfly turns out to bean inadequate teacher not only
for the ill-tempered sophist, but for Plato's brothers as well.
Glaucon and Adeimantus' dissatisfaction with Socrates’ methods, combined with Plato's
own change o f tactics, also suggests another kind o f criticism o f book 1. In that book, Plato
represents Thrasymachus’ response to the slipperiness o f Socrates’ arguments not as a legitimate
65 Cf. Annas Republic 39.

66 This may be in part attributed to Socrates' gentleness and good will (so Patterson 341-2), but his gentleness
accomplishes little in book 1, where Thrasymachus remains harshly sarcastic to the end (354a).
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uneasiness» but as crass and offensive rudeness which discredits the sophist personally. He
allows Socrates to exploit his role as narrator to portray Thrasymachus as a contemptible beast,
while at the same time subjecting him to an editorial mockery which belittles his objections (e.g.
336b, d, 344d).67 Socrates also interprets his interlocutor’s m otives for us, telling us, for
example, that Thrasymachus has been "made angry by the logos" (336d)—when otherwise we
might be forgiven for supposing that he had been made angry by Socrates. Later he informs us
that Thrasymachus’ reluctance to speak was a pretence, when he "clearly" wanted to show o ff
(338a). This kind o f interpretation o f the sophist's motives undermines the legitimacy o f his rage
at what he experiences as philosophical sharp practice.
In response to Thrasymachus' other main charge, that his method is too negative, Socrates
intimates that he would have given a positive definition o f justice if he could, but that
Thrasymachus prevented him (337abc, 337e, 339ab). Plato thus deploys Thrasymachus in such a
way as to suggest that Socrates does have a positive account to give, even though this sits uneasily
with his habitual claim to know nothing (cf. 337e, 354c). Once again Plato uses literary means (a
blocking character) to evade a serious methodological challenge. In both cases, the resources o f
dramatic characterization rather than philosophical argument are mobilized to exonerate Socrates by
belittling and discrediting his opponent.
But the intervention o f Glaucon and Adeimantus suggests that any such criticism s o f
Socrates should be evaluated independently o f the character o f those who utter them. By
introducing his brothers as talented, eloquent and good-natured spokesmen for injustice, Plato
im plicitly criticizes not only Socratic practice, but his own literary practice in representing it.
Socrates him self may not be guilty o f dialectical dishonesty, but Plato may still be guilty o f
allowing him too easy a victory. It is equally unfair to give Socrates a respondent who caves in too
easily, like Polemarchus (cf.336c), and a feisty but dialectically incompetent opponent like
Thrasymachus. As Glaucon puts it, the silencing o f Thrasymachus is merely an appearance o f
persuasion (357ab), for Plato has allowed him to be prematurely "charmed like a snake" (358b).
It is also unfair to counter unpalatable ideas by discrediting the personality o f the
messenger. The literary strategy o f book 1 suggested that Thrasymachus' peculiarly offensive
character is inseparable from his ethics. But according to Plato's brothers, it is not just
Thrasymachus who holds such view s, but all kinds o f ordinary people as w ell. They link
Thrasymachus and his ideas (358b, 367a, 367c) with the anonymous multitude o f those who value
justice only for its consequences (358a, 358c2, c6, 358c, 361e, 366b), including fathers and
guardians (362e), ordinary people and their leaders (366b), begging priests (364b-e) and poets
(363e etc), ancient heroes and even Socrates him self (366de). The brothers blur the distinctions
between a range o f different ethical positions, but by doing so they link Thrasymachus with the
consequentialism o f ordinary inoffensive people such as Cephalus.®* Such view s therefore cannot
be impugned by focusing on the personal unpleasantness o f this particular spokesman. Moreover
this technique is unsuccessful. Thé presence o f Cleitophon shows that Thrasymachus has
admirers despite his deplorable manners (cf. Cleit. 410c), and even Glaucon and Adeimantus are
subject to his influence. Plato therefore offers us retrospectively a new way o f reading book 1,
one which resists his own prejudicial use o f characterization. He makes Glaucon and Adeimantus
re-present Thrasymachus' view s as powerfully as possible, without ridicule, abuse, or any other
attempt to discredit personally those who hold them. Only if the sophist's view s are successfully
refuted under these conditions can w e be sure that his anger at Socrates—as opposed to the
argument—is not well founded.

67 Contrast 336b with the way Polemarchus breaks into die argument (33 Id). The difference is conveyed largely by
editorial description. Cf. also e.g. 337a.
69 For the sim ilarity between Cephalus and Thrasymachus cf. Murphy 2.
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III. N odding M andarins

Having said their say at the beginning o f book 2, Glaucon and Adeimantus quickly lapse into their
fam iliarroles as the Rosencrantz and Guildenstem o f ancient philosophy. There is a marked shift
away from Plato's earlier dramatic style, with its full and lively characterization. Despite the
occasional touch o f color, none o f the speakers is richly or idiosyncratically characterized.
Glaucon and Adeimantus become for the most part indistinguishable yes-men. Socrates him self
becom es less ironic, elusive and provocative in manner. Though he remains committed to
cooperative dialectic, he also becomes more paternalistic, didactic and uniformly earnest in tone.
He no longer attacks the unfounded wisdom o f others, but presents him self, despite protestations
o f personal uncertainty, as a teacher trying to demonstrate his ideas (e.g. 392d, 595c5). He lays
claim to "keener vision" than his interlocutors, and they in turn are happy to acknowledge his
intellectual superiority (595c-96a; cf. 533a). A ll three o f them agree that the task o f defending
justice belongs to Socrates.71 The enterprise has become unabashedly hierarchical, and this is
reflected in Plato's use o f literary form. Socrates' style becomes largely expository, punctuated by
expressions o f formulaic agreement from his respondents.
Despite this assymetry, however, the atmosphere remains collaborative. Since all the
participants are now committed to the same methods and goals, their dialectical interaction is no
longer agonistic, in contrast to Socrates' conversation with Thrasymachus in book 1 (cf.
474ab).72 Glaucon and Adeimantus share Socrates' interests and convictions, they do not get
affronted, and they never seem to weary o f hearing him talk. Their own positive contribution is
slight, but Socrates still treats them as full collaborators in the argument, eliciting their agreement at
every step, and attributing even the most outlandish ideas to them as w ell as himself. The brothers
accept this, with only the occasional trace o f hesitation or self-consciousness.75 Even at their most
passive, then, Socrates' respondents remain implicated in the argument by their acquiescence.
This is an important survival from the earlier Socratic method, but it im poses little
restriction on Socrates' creativity, now that he is exploring his own ideas with the help o f
sympathetic and intelligent interlocutors. Rather than hampering Socrates, Glaucon and
Adeimantus play the role o f cheer-leaders, encouraging him in his daunting task, (hawing him out
on obscure points, and preventing him from getting away with things.'^ The question is no
longer how Socrates can best aid the interlocutor by clarifying his ideas, but how the interlocutor
can best aid Socrates by answering, as Glaucon puts it, "more harmoniously than another" (474a;
cf. 475e, 595b).77 it is this kind o f sympathetic support that enables Socrates to run the risk o f
the exposure entailed by positive discourse (cf. 473e-74b, 450a-51b), the same risk that
Thrasymachus jeered at him for avoiding (336c, 337e, 338b). H is highly speculative and
controversial ideas are greeted with support and admiration rather than the sceptical questioning o f
the elenchus.
But Glaucon and Adeimantus are not entirely uncritical. From time to time they slip into
their earlier role o f devil's advocate (e.g. 419a, 487bcd). This enables them to voice the objections
71 Cf. 358d, 367d, 368bc, 427de, 449b-50a, 506b.
72 Cf. Annas Republic 59.
73 E.g. 371c, 372a, 381c, 394d, 398e-99a, 400a, 402d.
75 Cf. 389a, 396b 10/c4,432d, 475a, 597a8-9.
76 E.g. 369b, 374e, 376cd, 427de, 449b-51b, 471c-72b, 473ab.
77 Cf. Meno 57de, Euthvd. 282c, Tht. 185e, Parm. 137b.
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o f ordinary people without personal commitment, and so rasure that their habitual agreement does
not allow Socrates to evade the larger challenge posed at the beginning o f book 2. Only in book 9
does Glaucon finally surrender on behalf o f die champion o f injustice (590a). The brothers also
voice occasional objections o f their own (e.g. 372cd), but never in a hostile or personally offensive
manner. Such friendly objections are entirely proper to the dialectical character, suggesting as they
do close engagement and intellectual vigor. Hato uses these moments to facilitate the development
o f the argument. Glaucon's objection to the "city o f pigs" (372cd), for example, is not really an
obstacle, but prompts the necessary further development o f the ideal state. And after making such
objections, the brothers always accept Socrates' further explanations. Their more frequent--and
often w ell justified-failures to catch the drift o f his argument show that they have been paying
attention, while obliging Socrates to clarify and develop his ideas.
These simultaneous changes in Plato’s dramatic style and Socrates' dialectical method may
be viewed as a response to the limitations o f the elenchus, some o f which emerged from book 1.
One o f the most serious o f these problems with the earlier method was its negativity. As Guthrie
and many others have suggested, the move towards positive exposition prompted Plato to provide
Socrates with a broader canvas on which to develop his ideas. But this alone is not enough to
account for the stylistic changes. The construction o f the ideal state could have been a lively,
cooperative venture, with real objections raised and discussed, and real contributions from several
individualized characters. Instead, Hato makes little effort to differentiate the interlocutors and
seems to w illfully bypass opportunities for them to shine (e.g. 375d).
What made the earlier dramatic style uniquely appropriate to the Socratic method, however,
was the personal character o f the elenchus, its rootedness in the individual character o f each
interlocutor and their personal interactions with Socrates. As Hato moves away from this method,
the lively characterization o f the earlier style is no longer necessary. Since Socrates is no longer
engaged in refuting ideas as held by particular persons, the proper representation o f the argument
no longer requires individual characterization o f the respondents. Indeed, as Hato abandons the
elenchus, the personal dramatic style becomes not only irrelevant but a positive liability. For
individual characterization privileges the kind o f personal idiosyncrasy that interferes with
philosophical progress and undermines the universality o f the argument.
It is the elenctic Socrates’ preoccupation with the particular which causes at least some o f
his failures. His method is rooted in the scrutiny o f the individual soul, in the optimistic hope that
each in turn can be converted to the philosophic life. If he constantly fails, and succeeds primarily
in alienating others, that is because his "testing" (a basic meaning o f elenchost is ironically one
which shows up the particular weaknesses o f character and intellect that incapacitate most people
for such a life. His egalitarian search for the potential wisdom in respondents o f all kinds seems
doomed to failure.^ It also distracts him from developing his own ideas and making the most o f
his unparallelled philosophical skill and creativity. The method o f Plato's later Socrates thus
becomes not only more impersonal, but more didactic, authoritarian and hierarchical. Socrates is
no longer testing idiosyncratic individuals for their philosophical potential, but trying to construct a
positive argument o f his own. He has been wasting his time talking to just anyone he happens to
meet. He needs as interlocutors not flawed individuals but talented and sympathetic philosophy
students, whose characters w ill show under what circumstances such positive progress can take
place.
This new kind o f dialectic still calls in principle for a sympathetic response to the individual
interlocutor. But in practice, as we have seen, positive and cooperative dialectic calls for qualities
which militate against individuality. If Socrates’ respondents have all the necessary qualities for
success at dialectic, he no longer needs to tailor his method to their particular needs. We must
79 For Socrates' willingness to tackle anyone indiscriminately cf. Apol. 29d, 30a.

Draft 2/19/92

13

therefore content ourselves with cardboad renditions o f mutually interchangeable philosophy
students. That is why Glaucon and Adeimantus are, as characters, virtually indistinguishable.
What matters about them is not their idiosyncrasies, but their philosophical receptiveness, which is
no longer a personal matter but appears identically in both o f them. (Perhaps it was to make this
point that Plato bothered to use two interlocutors at all.)
If Glaucon and Adeimantus are
uninteresting, it is not because Plato no longer cares about the qualities required for successful
philosophizing, but because he has com e to see those qualities as essentially uniform, and has
become correspondingly suspicious o f the kind o f personal idiosyncrasies with which the elenctic
Socrates wrestled in his opponents.
In speaking o f Glaucon and Adeimantus' philosophical talents, however, I have neglected
one important fact--their lack of intellectual flair and creativity. They have the necessary character
traits to serve as useful interlocutors for the newly creative Socrates. They also display many o f
the intellectual qualities required for dialectic, suchas quick comprehension and a good memory.
But they are not yet ready for the higher reaches o f dialectic. 87 As Socrates approaches the topic
o f the Good, he worries about misleading his interlocutors with inadequate explanations (506c507a; cf. 504b-e). When he reaches a point where Glaucon w ill be able to follow him no further,
he cuts his discourse short (533a; cf. 534b). Further dialectical progress requires rigorous
propaedeutic studies in mathematics and astronomy (533a). Socrates' bland and receptive students
have yet to graduate from cheer-leading to creative autonomy. They have reached the limits o f their
current comprehension, and in doing so have finally imposed some constraints upon Socrates'
philosophizing.
The fact that Glaucon and Adeimantus have so little to contribute reflects Plato's pessimism
about the natural, social and educational conditions which may succeed in fostering the growth o f a
true philosopher. They have made a promising start, but the argument o f the Republic, as w ell as
its form, indicates just how far they still have to go. Yet even if they have not yet gained access to
the truth, they still exem plify the character needed by one who wishes to work towards it. As
such, the reader can and should identify with them and emulate their philosophical virtues,
including the determination to keep on striving for something that may lie forever beyond our
reach. Glaucon and Adeimantus themselves may perhaps seem too acquiescent—too stuck at the
primary stage o f the guardians' education—ever to attain that goal. But even their most wooden
responses invite resistance from the reader, by leaving us space to question what they
unhesitatingly accept. Even in the later books, then, Plato's use o f dramatic form helps to lure us
beyond simple acquiescence to pedagogical authority. In doing so, it invites us to identify with our
other character model, Socrates himself, who exem plifies a higher level o f philosophical creativity
and insight By offering us both teacher and students as models, Plato displaces onto his dramatic
characters the tension between authoritarian dogmatism and creative autonomy which pervades his
work.
Glaucon and Adeimantus, then, play a more interesting role than is at first sight apparent.
However much we may regret the replacement o f the colorful interlocutors who inhabit book 1
with the bland yes-men o f books 2-10, we must not underestimate the philosophical significance o f
Plato’s changing cast o f characters.

87 Glaucon seems to be familiar with the theory of Forms (475e), but this does not mean he has glimpsed die
Forms himself.
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